Assad knew from his long experience, as an army officer and Minister of Defense, that Israel worries about the presence of the Syrian armed forces

Bouthaina Shaaban

Second round in Damascus.. Last part..
..Egypt quit the battle..
Assad knew from his long experience, as an army officer and Minister of Defense, that #Israel worries about the presence of the Syrian armed forces with artillery and tanks on the hills overlooking the plain of the hill of the testicular lands on the occupied west side of the #Golan plateau But looking at the bigger picture, Assad knew Israel was not interested in a few kilometers, and its leaders wanted to achieve ′′ Greater Israel from Euphrates to Nile “.
Assad #Kissinger stated that the Israeli Defense Minister #MosheDayan said in his first speech after the six-day war: ′′ We are the founding generation, we have succeeded in reaching the 1967 border, and you 1967nd generation have the task of reaching the border. Greater Israel “. So Syria realizes that because of these ambitions that the Israelis did not hide, Israel will not withdraw from the occupied territories voluntarily.
Kissinger saw things differently, of course; he agreed with Assad that Israel became less inclined to abandon lands after the October War. When he met #GoldaMair after the war when he visited #US, Kissinger suggested that Israel withdraw to the 22 October line – ceasefire line. Meyer rejected this proposal and revoked her anger on Kissinger, and turned her back on him throughout the dinner the Israeli embassy in #Washington held in #Washington in honor, and then Kissinger commented jokingly:
′′ Her back is as beautiful as her face ′′ But since Kissinger’s diplomacy on the Egyptian front has paid off an agreement, ‘ continuing American pressure ‘, according to his claim, has pushed Meir to undo its intransigence.
Kissinger was willing to pledge to Assad that negotiations start on the Syrian front, he will do his best to prevent its failure. The last remaining obstacle, however, was Assad’s insistence on agreeing to determine the final results before the start of the negotiating process. Kissinger argued that in the Egyptian case he was already aware of the Egyptian demands and the ceiling of Israeli concessions, enabling him to intervene in the right time and place, but this did not apply to the Syrian talks. If he seemed to tend to the Syrian situation, Israel would quickly destroy him.
The best way to move forward, from Kissinger’s point of view, is to submit his proposal, then he mediates to bridge the gap. He proposed to Assad an honor agreement under which the US minister convey what only Syrians allow to the Israeli on the subject of separation of forces, and vice versa.
With this initial green light from the United States to start the Golan negotiations, Assad presented his position, and explained that Syria deposited three maps (which were not memorized in the Syrian archive) contain details of Syrian choices about separation of forces, and it is now Kissinger’s turn to see it.
Each map contained a suggestion not different from the previous one by more than five kilometers, but Syria would not accept less than what it considered as a minimum separation line. Assad found that there is no point in discussing the details of demilitarized zones and #mitigation zones, and the only guarantee without renewing the conflict in his view is international agreements. Before the October war, Israel dug a seventy-kilometre trench on the Golan Front and the Suez Canal displayed huge minefields in hopes of stopping Syrian tanks. However, on the first day of the war, seventy thousand Syrian soldiers crossed this trench, cleaned minefields and destroyed most of the Israeli fortifications, killed or captured their soldiers. Assad noticed that only American support prevented defeat Israel, not its fortifications.
Syria was ready to launch a counterattack to restore the occupied pocket during the war, but the plan was cancelled when Egypt accepted the ceasefire. Kissinger couldn’t stop himself from commenting on what Assad said and started asking about the reasons why Syria agreed to ceasefire.
The Syrian president replied with his highest voice: ′′ Egypt has left the battle! “.
The Syrian military command had told its Egyptian counterpart that preparations for an opposite attack are underway, and that the war must continue on both fronts, but Anwar Sadat hopes that Assad accepts a ceasefire before Egypt and Syria lose everything. But Assad refused, so Egypt acted alone, and declared acceptance of a ceasefire on 22 October 1973.
The Syrian leadership has realized that confrontation of Israel without Egypt, especially in the light of the American air bridge carrying massive amounts of weapons and equipment, is impossible, and accepted the ceasefire on the evening of October 23, 1973.
Al-Assad reminds of the bitterness of what happened back then ′′ Sadat told me on the phone that there are guarantees from the two superpowers that Israel will withdraw from the occupied Arab territories, and of course restoring lands without the continuation of the war is the best option. ′′
From the book ′′ The Brink of the Abyss ′′ #Homeland _ Document ′′
Historic narrative of #Hafez _ Assad and Henry Kissinger’s discussions
Dr. #Bathina _ Shaaban, special advisor to the presidency of the Syrian Arab Republic