Nixon administration was under the ramifications of Watergate and Senator Jackson’s pressure

Source: Bouthaina Shaaban

Second round in Damascus.. Part two..
At this time, the Nixon administration was under the ramifications of Watergate and Senator Jackson’s pressure, who disrupted the American administration’s quest to give the Soviet Union preferential treatment in the commercial field, which was part of the reconciliation policy by which I want to ease tensions between The two great powers.
Jackson’s stated goal was to put pressure on the Soviet leadership to allow Jewish immigration from the #Soviet _ Union, supported by the Jewish lobby in #Washington. But the main goal of his campaign was to break the entire policy of reconciliation and not to paralyze American diplomacy in the Middle East.
Kissinger has adopted a step policy – a step and separating peace paths from the previous determination and determination, not in response to the pressure of the Jewish lobby or the Democratic Party. The only negative effect of #Jackson’s campaign is
Destroying the reconciliation process will lead to Soviet intransigence that the Soviet leadership attempts to disrupt American politics in the Middle East, but this did not happen during the Syrian negotiations. In addition, it is true that the Jewish lobby hated seeing Israel under pressure to withdraw from the #Golan full of settlers. But at that stage of negotiations, Americans were not asking Israelis to make any major withdrawal from the Golan, nor were the Israelis against the idea of a complete withdrawal, as they agreed to a wider withdrawal during kilometre 101 negotiations with Egyptians in November 1973 Bigger than Kissinger offered in three months separation talks.
They’ve been accepting partial withdrawals, contrary to what Kissinger claimed. Yet #Assad seemed convinced of this excuse, he even warned Kissinger that ′′ new Watergate ′′ was in the process.
At that moment, an idea entrenched in Assad’s mind is that the Jewish lobby stands behind the Watergate scandal to prevent Nixon from imposing a comprehensive settlement on Israel. This theory was reinforced when the Water Gate Nixon scandal prompted to resign two months after his visit to Damascus in June 1974, in which the US president explained what Assad pledged this president to work on a comprehensive Middle East settlement All the occupied Arab territories are restored.
Assad will still hold on to this idea in the next two decades despite the change in U.S. Departments, as 1991 said to the U.S. Secretary of State James Baker: ′′ After our meeting Nixon made a statement that his insight is identical to what the United Nations said about This is the struggle. Then he went back to the US and Wattergate suddenly Nixon disappeared and launched a quick campaign, and we believe this has a fundamental relationship with his stance on peace in the region.
From the book ′′ The Brink of the Abyss ′′ #Homeland _ Document ′′
Historic narrative of #Hafez _ Assad and Henry Kissinger’s discussions
Dr. #Bathina _ Shaaban, Special Adviser to the Presidency of the Syrian Arab Republic, p. 67.

Assad and Anwar #Sadat were best friends. It was the first two men meeting during the Syrian Egyptian

Bouthaina Shaaban

Egypt drift away..
Once upon a time, Hafez Al-Assad and Anwar #Sadat were best friends. It was the first two men meeting during the Syrian Egyptian unit that did not live long in the late s. Although Assad is ten years younger, Assad admired this Egyptian military leader who turned to a politician for initially commitment to Arab nationalism and his unwavering devotion to President Jamal Abdel Nasser.
When Sadat was a junior officer during World War II secretly worked with the Germans against British occupiers in Egypt, two officers were killed and he went to prison for his work, something the lion truly loved about. It was Sadat who announced to the world the success of the free officers revolution, which overthrew King Farouk and captured the minds and hearts of Syrians, including Assad, in 1952.
Sadat’s first disappointment came in September 1961, when Syrian military officers overthrew the unity regime in Damascus; Sadat accepts a negative separation as a harsh reality, and did not move a finger to defend the unit. As for the lion, he was seen as the biggest disaster of his life, only the six-day war in 1967.
The difference in the two characters from the first moment after the breakup was observed. Sadat’s tendency to ′′ Egypt First ′′ policy is emerging and that policy has become the distinctive characteristic of his presidency. Meanwhile Assad immediately started holding secret meetings with members of the Baathist movement and secret Nasiriyah, to discuss how to return the United Arab Republic.
Assad was firmly convinced that had the separation not occurred in 1961, the Arabs would not have been defeated in 1967, and Israel would not have won the #Golan plateau.
Anwar Sadat and Al-Assad’s keeper took over power in Egypt and #Syria with a time break less than one month between them, in late 1970 Sadat Jamal Abdel Nasser succeeded in October and Assad made his corrective move in November.
Just ten days after Assad took over power, he left Damascus, not heading to Aleppo or Latakia, but to #Cairo, the former capital of the United Arab Republic. There is a lengthy meeting with the gentlemen and the two men decided to work side by side and hand.
Foundations of a new #unit swinging with the young Libyan leader #Muammar _ Gaddafi. It seems that Assad was fully confident in his Egyptian counterpart and that the respect and trust were mutual. Before and during the October War, Sadat effectively put a framed picture of Al-Assad’s Governor behind his office in Cairo, and he presented it before during his interviews with #Arab and Western journalists.
The October war failed to restore occupied territories, but this increased the Assad’s design. Yet the war left Sadat on the verge of a nervous breakdown, the third Egyptian army was surrounded, and the city of #Suez was completely besieged by Israelis.
Sadat was eager to follow the political line to save his troops and to achieve one of the goals of waging war, the goal is to complete the transition once and for all to the American range. He spent the entire war period in mutual contacts with Henry #Kissinger.
When the defender was silent, Sadat sent his Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy to the American capital on October 28 The next day direct negotiations started between Egyptian and Israeli officers, headed by the Chief of Operations of the Egyptian Armed Forces, Marshal Mohamed Al-Jamsi, and Israeli General Aaron Yarif, at the 101 km point on Suez Cairo Road on Egyptian territory. On October 31, Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meyer launched to Washington, D.C.
From the book ′′ The Brink of the Abyss ′′ #Homeland _ Document ′′
Historic novel of #Hafez _ Assad and Henry Kissinger’s discussions
Dr. #Bathina _ Shaaban, special advisor to the presidency of the Syrian Arab Republic

Kissinger continued his mission and put the POW issue under discussion. Israel insisted that it will not sit at a single discussion

Dr.Bouthaina Shaaban

Kissinger in Damascus.. blocked road.. part three..
Kissinger continued his mission and put the POW issue under discussion. Israel insisted that it will not sit at a single discussion table with #Syria unless Damascus releases prisoners of war. #Sadat agreed to liberate all Israeli detainees in early October, as part of the six-point agreement to ensure aid shipments reach the besieged third army. Americans did not ask Syria to go as far as possible on this issue. But, proof of goodwill, Damascus had to release the wounded from Israeli detainees in Syrian prisons, and allow the ICRC to visit the rest of them.
Once a final agreement has been reached, Syria has released all Israelis detained since October 1973. Kissinger indicated, if Assad’s approval, this would provide the United States of America with an argument to use in its forthcoming talks with Israelis But Assad categorically rejected the request, saying it’s too early to discuss a topic like this, and Kissinger reminded that his trust in Israelis is non-existent. Regardless of any debate regarding the issue of prisoners of war, Syria’s participation in the #Geneva _ Conference is contingent upon reaching an agreement on the topic of separation of forces, Assad has emphasized that this must be achieved before and not after the conference. And #Assad wouldn’t have given up the prisoner of war paper as simple as that to start discussions or just to satisfy Americans. The Geneva talks were a waste of time and credibility for the Syrian president, neither he wanted those talks nor the Syrian people wanted them.
Kissinger said if the conference collapses, or if it is never held, it will make it a joke for the international community. The lion interrupted him saying: ′′ This is not a personal matter Dr. Kissinger. War, peace, and occupation are things that must be dealt with with absolute clarity, otherwise any misunderstanding of it will lead to a disaster “.
Afterwards, the parties discussed a final option, as Kissinger suggested he arrange pre-conference talks between Syrian and Israeli officers to discuss the topics of separation of troops and prisoners of war. However, Kissinger warned that talks can succeed, the Israeli s’ stimulus to attend the conference will become small because the next debate will be to consider their withdrawal to pre-war lines.
The lion again took down this subtraction, refusing the idea of dividing the #Arabs, unaware of Sadat’s true intentions.
It seemed clear that conversations reached a dead end. Kissinger wanted the conference but wasn’t able or willing to give the lion anything concrete in return. Six years after the breakdown of relations, Assad’s confidence in his American interlocutors was small, plus his confidence in Sadat was fading quickly. Assad suggested Kissinger look back at the map to try to find answers or solutions saying: ′′ People call you American politics engineer, and this is not a complicated issue “.
Kissinger replied: ′′ It took four years to settle
The conflict in #Vietnam “. seems to have been upset about the excessive expectations of the Arabs of his diplomacy, perhaps due to his amazing reputation of opening up to China and ending the Vietnam War.
This blind Arab trust in Kissinger, which he has taken advantage of without hesitation, will reflect devastating results in the coming months or years.
From the book ′′ The Brink of the Abyss ′′ #Homeland _ Document ′′
Historic narrative of #Hafez _ Assad and Henry Kissinger’s discussions
Dr. #Bathina _ Shaaban, Special Adviser to the Presidency of the Syrian Arab Republic